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 1 
1 Introduction 
For most of its history, international law has been concerned with the actions of 
states.  Thus, the rights and duties it detailed were the rights of and duties placed upon 
states.  In the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, international law shifted toward 
granting more extensive rights to non-state actors while placing limited duties upon them 
as well.  These new rights blossomed into modern human rights law, with its core treaties 
and widespread theoretical support.  On the other hand, these new duties were mainly 
confined to international criminal law.  For example, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights detailed many rights but crammed only a few vague duties into the end of the 
document.  Until the latter part of the 20
th
 Century, this new situation continued.  Non-state 
actors—mostly individuals—held rights against states, but had very few duties in return.   
With the rise of globalization and the end of the Cold War, interest increased in 
defining more duties for non-state actors.  In contrast to rights, however, these proposed 
duties were to be placed mostly on non-individuals including, inter alia, corporations, non-
governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations.  After the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the fight against terrorism has brought a new perspective to the 
potential duties to be placed on non-state actors.  While much has been written about the 
dynamic legal framework related to terrorism, very little has focused on the theoretical 
foundations for, and practical implications of, how international law places terrorism-
related duties on non-state actors.   
I aim to place the modern international regulations relating to terrorism in a 
theoretical framework of how international law places duties on non-state actors.  This 
framework is built upon the pyramid of duties established in a lead article in the American 
Journal of International Law by John H. Knox,
1
 hereafter referred to as the “Knox 
Pyramid.”  In the rest of Part 1, I will clarify the scope of the laws I will analyze and the 
method I will use.  In Part 2, I will briefly present the Knox Pyramid of duties.  In Part 3, I 
will analyze the state of the current law and how it fits within this pyramid.  In Part 4, I 
will offer suggestions on where the law should fit within the pyramid.  Finally, in Part 5, I 
will suggest some conclusions. 
                                                 
1
 See generally Knox 
 2 
In order to appreciate how the laws on terrorism place duties on non-state actors, 
it’s important to understand exactly which non-state actors are being discussed.  At its 
heart, this is an idea that is both clear and unclear.  It's clear because “non-state” is a 
negative definition that it refers to any type of actor other than a state.
2
  In common usage, 
however, it can mean a variety of things in different contexts.  Additionally, the phrase is 
often used by authors only in the context of their article without realization of the wide-
ranging ramifications of the phrase.  In many pieces, it is used almost exclusively for 
multinational corporations, but individuals, international organizations, and guerilla groups 
come under its scope as well.
3
 
In this paper, I will focus on non-state actors as individuals and, in particular, how 
the thirteen modern, multilateral terrorism treaties (“the treaties” or “the terrorism 
treaties”) place duties on individuals.4  These widely ratified treaties were chosen because 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Alston, The Not-a-Cat Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime 
Accommodate Non-State Actors? in Non-state Actors and Human Rights 
3
 See, for example, Kaleck, Wolfgang and Saage-Maaß, p. 719-720 
4
 The treaties in force are: 
1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 
September 1963 [Tokyo Convention] 
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970 
[Hague Convention] 
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal 
on 23 September 1971 [Montreal Convention] 
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973 
[Diplomatic Agents Convention] 
5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 17 December 1979 [Hostages Convention] 
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna on 3 March 1980 [Nuclear 
Materials Convention] 
7. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988 [Montreal Protocol] 
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome 
on 10 March 1988 [Maritime Convention] 
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988 [Fixed Platform Protocol] 
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 
March 1991 [Plastic Explosives Convention] 
11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 15 December 1997 [Terrorist Bombing Convention] 
12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999 [Terrorist Financing Convention] 
13. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 13 April 2005 [Nuclear Terrorism Convention] 
 
I chose not to include the draft Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism because of its 
unfinished nature.  If it is ever completed, however, it would be included in a list of this type.  Additionally, I 
did not include treaties not yet in force, such as the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating 
to Civil Aviation, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010, updating the Montreal Convention.   
 3 
they represent the core of the international response to terrorism and are classified as “the 
United Nations Conventions on Terrorism” by the United Nations itself. 5  While there are 
a few United Nations Security Council resolutions related to terrorism, several regional 
conventions against terrorism, and a plethora of domestic laws against terrorism, this 
paper’s scope covers only these core multilateral treaties.  Additionally, I will only be 
examining the treaties themselves, not customary international law related to terrorism, 
regardless of whether or not it derived from the treaties.  As a result of this focus on the 
treaties, this paper also will not cover state-sponsored terrorism or domestic terrorism, as 
the scope of the treaties does not include these two types of terrorism. 
Finally, I want to emphasize that, while the word “duties” carries a variety of 
meanings, for the purposes of this paper, the focus is only on legal duties.  The types of 
potential duties related to terrorism—philosophical, ethical, moral, etc.—pose intriguing 
questions, but are outside the scope of this paper. 
The primary methodology I will be employing is a textual based analysis of the 
terrorism treaties, using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary 
international law related to treaty interpretation.
6
  As mentioned, I will be applying the 
framework of the Knox Pyramid in analyzing the treaties.  Additionally, I have consulted 
legal articles related to the treaties, both contemporaneous to the treaties and more recent 
analysis, in order to aid treaty interpretation and I have also utilized legal articles related to 
international duties and non-state actors in general.  Finally, I have also cited a few cases 
and non-treaty based primary sources.   
                                                 
5
 http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG (accessed August 1, 
2011) 
6
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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2 The Knox Pyramid 
2.1 Background 
 John H. Knox developed his pyramid of duties in response to arguments in favor of 
expanding the duties of non-state actors under international human rights law.  In his view, 
any proposed expansion is a potentially dangerous and radical departure from the tenets 
upon which human rights law developed, as these duties could be used to limit human 
rights.
7
   
 Knox argues that the existing international human rights law incorporates the 
delicate balance achieved by the negotiators of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
between rights and duties.  These negotiators, after considerable debate, refused to list any 
duties that individuals owe to society
8
 (but did acknowledge that such competing interests 
exist) and instead focused on limiting how the state can use these duties to curb rights.  The 
negotiators agreed upon this approach because they “saw the danger that governments 
might otherwise rely on those duties to limit human rights in unpredictable, unacceptable 
ways.”9  By refusing to list duties to limit rights, they indicated that rights were more than 
mere interests while, at the same time, they acknowledged that duties to society and to 
others do exist.  This approach, however, left open the question of which societal interests 
outweigh rights. 
 The framework created by the negotiators of the Universal Declaration leaves an 
implicit distinction between those private duties owed to society and those owed to 
individual right holders.  As presented by Knox, these are the two main types of private 
duties: converse and correlative.  Converse duties are: 
 
duties owed by the individual to the society or state, such as a duty to obey 
the laws of the state.  Although these duties may appear to be horizontal, in 
the sense that they are owed to others in the duty holder's society, in 
practice they are vertical, enforced by the government acting on behalf of 
                                                 
7
 Knox, p. 2 
8
 “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 29(2). 
9
 Knox, p. 9 
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the society.  They run conversely to the vertical duties of the government to 
promote and protect the individual's human rights.
10
   
 
In contrast, correlative duties, private duties to respect the human rights of others, are truly 
horizontal “in the sense that they run between actors on the same legal plane.”11 
 This division of private duties into two groups is necessary because of the practical 
impact of the type of duty.  Converse duties are dangerous because they provide 
governments with a ready-made counter argument for violations of human rights.  After 
all, if an individual owes duties to the state and the individual has not fulfilled his or her 
duties, then the state can argue that it is relieved from fulfilling its duties to protect the 
individual’s converse right.  Correlative duties, in contrast, “appear to further, rather than 
undermine, the enjoyment of human rights,” because they protect the human rights of 
another individual.
12
  As a result, international human rights law rarely lists converse 
duties but is much more willing to list correlative duties.
13
 
 The Knox pyramid focuses on these correlative duties, attempting to illustrate how 
the manner in which the duty is placed is significant.  Knox’s theory looks at each duty as 
the flip side of a corresponding right.  While the rights are traditionally categorized under 
one coherent body of law (i.e., human rights law), the duties are often scattered among 
human rights law, humanitarian law, and criminal law.  Regardless of which legal area the 
duty resides in, however, the right it correlates to is a human right.  For example, the duty 
not to commit genocide relates to the right to life.
 14
   
Similarly, the duties in the terrorism treaties, although rarely recognized as such, all 
relate to human rights.  Most notably, these duties also correlate, at minimum, to the right 
to life.  Thus, although it may appear odd at first glance to use a human rights based 
framework when analyzing terrorism treaties, the nature of these private duties ensures 
their direct link to human rights law.   
2.2 Structure of the Knox Pyramid 
The Knox pyramid recognizes that international law addresses these duties placed upon 
non-state actors in four ways: 
                                                 
10
 Knox, p. 1-2 
11
 Knox, p. 2 
12
 Knox, p. 2 
13
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is a notable exception to the general rule as it includes 
numerous converse duties in its text.  The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, however, has 
interpreted the import of these duties to be so minimal as to delete them from the Charter.  
14
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 6(1) 
 6 
 
At its lowest level of involvement, human rights law contemplates that 
states have general duties to restrict private actions that interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights, but leaves to governments the task of specifying 
the resulting private duties.  At the next level, human rights law itself 
specifies the private duties that governments are obligated to impose.  At 
both of these levels, international law imposes private duties indirectly, as a 
secondary effect of the duties it places directly on states.  At a higher level 
of involvement, human rights law directly places duties on private actors 
but continues to leave enforcement of those duties to domestic law.  Finally, 
at the highest level of involvement, human rights law enforces private duties 
at the international level, through international tribunals or other 
institutions
15
 (emphasis in original). 
 
These levels form a pyramid as international law “contemplates more correlative duties 
than it specifies” and “specifies many more duties than it directly places and enforces.”16   
 At the lowest level of the pyramid (level one), human rights law only contemplates 
the duties that non-state actors face; all specification and enforcement is left to states.  The 
actual obligation placed upon states at this level is also quite low, “merely that 
governments use due diligence to ensure that human rights are protected from private 
interference.”17  This is counterbalanced somewhat by its breadth because the due 
diligence obligation encompasses every right capable of being violated by non-state actors.  
The most important example of this obligation, as Knox notes, is Article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), which states, “Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”18  
This obligation for state parties to ensure to all individuals the rights in the CCPR does not 
specify in any greater detail what governments must do to meet this standard, but rather 
leaves specification and enforcement to states.  This is the baseline position of human 
rights law.
19
 
 At the next level of the pyramid (level two), human rights law specifies the duties 
that non-state actors face through either international agreements or interpretations by 
                                                 
15
 Knox, p. 18 
16
 Knox, p. 18 
17
 Knox, p. 21 
18
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 2(1) 
19
 For a more detailed analysis assessing bystander responsibility under international human rights law, see 
Hakimi’s State Bystander Responsibility.  Hakimi focuses on state responsibility rather than individual 
responsibility, but many issues overlap with the structure presented by Knox as both attempt to assess how 
international human rights law can and should interact with non-state actors. 
 7 
international institutions.
20
  The obligation placed upon states at this level is a bit more 
onerous as they are no longer granted the freedom of level one.  While there is often still 
some room for creativity in implementation, the level of specificity here is much greater.  
For example, Article 13 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) requires state parties to “take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in other areas of economic and social 
life,” including, inter alia, equal rights “to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of 
financial credit.”21  Although this provision is rather specific—and thus high level two—it 
leaves the remainder of the specification and all of the enforcement to states. 
At the next level of the pyramid (level three), human rights law places duties 
directly on non-state actors.  The key distinction is that, at this level, private actors are 
bound as a matter of international law as opposed to being bound through the operation of 
domestic laws.  Almost all of the duties at this level are found in international criminal 
law.
22
  The clearest example is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) whose Article 1 states, “The Contracting 
Parties confirm that genocide […] is a crime under international law which they undertake 
to prevent and to punish.”23  At this level, the duty is specified and placed by international 
law, with only enforcement left to the states.
24
  
At the top level of the pyramid (level four), human rights law enforces duties 
directly against non-state actors.  Knox notes, “Since the creation of the International 
Criminal Court, most of the duties directly placed on private actors may be enforced, under 
certain circumstances, at the international level.”25  These types of duties may also be 
enforced by international tribunals, but it is important not to overstate the likelihood that 
level three duties will migrate to level four.  Although most of these duties can be enforced 
at the international level, most often they are not.  For instance, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) requires that a state be unwilling or unable to 
                                                 
20
 In spite of the fact that most of these interpretations are non-binding, Knox defends their inclusion, noting 
that these “non-legally binding views can have persuasive effect, setting out interpretive positions around 
which state practice may coalesce.”  Knox, p. 25 
21
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art 13(b) 
22
 Knox, p. 28 
23
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art 1 
24
 Of course, under a dualist system, states must still implement the international law within their domestic 
legal systems.  Private actors within a given state, however, are bound once the state becomes a party to the 
treaty.   
25
 Knox, p. 30 
 8 
prosecute an individual before a case is admissible before it.
26
  In general, there is a strong 
reluctance to enforce private duties directly under international law.  Thus, the vast 
majority of correlative duties under human rights law remain in the bottom half of the 
Knox pyramid.   
                                                 
26
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 17(1) 
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3 Analysis of how the United Nations Conventions on Terrorism fit within 
the Knox Pyramid 
3.1 An analysis of the structure of the treaties 
The thirteen widely ratified conventions related to terrorism are broadly similar in 
structure, in spite of both the lengthy period over which they were drafted and the variety 
of actions they cover.  The earliest convention is from 1963,
27
 while the latest is from 
2005.
28
  The scope of the conventions includes several aviation and maritime related acts, 
hostage taking and threats against diplomats, bombings and nuclear terrorism, and the 
financing of terrorism.  The conventions emerged through the international community 
identifying specific terrorist threats and responding with specific treaties to combat those 
threats.  For example, in light of the increasing amount of aircraft hijackings in the late 
1960s, the Hague Convention for the unlawful seizure of aircraft was completed in 1970.
29
   
Notwithstanding the variety of actions covered and decades over which the treaties 
were written, aside from features found in almost all treaties (rules on entry into force, 
duration of time for signature and ratification, depository information, etc.), these 
multilateral terrorism treaties are remarkably similar.  The treaties share five primary 
features.
30
  First, they recognize a particular terrorist offence or set of offenses.  Second, 
they require state parties to criminalize these offenses under domestic law.  Third, they 
require state parties to establish jurisdiction over these offenses.  Fourth, they require state 
parties to extradite or prosecute offenders.  Fifth, they require state parties to cooperate 
with one another in respect to actions covered by the treaty.  Overall, the treaties are highly 
similar in structure and language.  Because of these similarities, I will analyze one 
representative treaty comprehensively while using illustrative examples from each of the 
other treaties.   
                                                 
27
 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft 
28
 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
29
 Worldwide aircraft hijackings increased from six in 1967 to 91 in 1969.  Fiorita p. 285.  Additionally, the 
Hague Convention’s preamble notes that there is “an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for 
punishment of offenders.” 
30
 The categorization for this section expands on the work of John P. Grant in Beyond the Montreal 
Convention, p. 456-59. 
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The Plastic Explosives Convention, however, is an exception.
31
  Unlike the other 
twelve treaties, its language is directed at states rather than individuals.
32
  Additionally, the 
five commonalities from the other treaties are absent or not clearly delineated in the 
convention.  As a result, for reasons of scope and analytical clarity, I will not include this 
treaty in my structural analysis.   
The Hostages Convention, in the context of the conventions on terrorism, is one of 
the most straightforward of the treaties, yet still illustrates the five areas of commonality.  
Chronologically, the treaty is the fifth to be signed, having been completed in 1979.  By 
the time of its signature, the language used to describe each of these commonalities had 
become more standardized with merely the text surrounding the core commonalities 
changing from treaty to treaty.   
After the success of the piecemeal approaches to combating international terrorism 
as evidenced by the first four treaties, the international community—and, in particular, 
some Western powers—searched for other discrete areas in which a multilateral treaty 
might be feasible.
33
  In light of the Munich Massacre during the 1972 Summer Olympics, 
West Germany pressed for such a treaty against the taking of hostages.
34
  As the drafting 
process closed and the convention was presented for a vote by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, in view of many states, the still unfolding Iran-United States hostage crisis 
further amplified the need for a convention detailing the illegality of hostage taking.
35
 
This historical background manifests itself in the treaty’s preamble, which has 
much stronger language than most of the other treaties, stating that the state parties are 
“convinced that it is urgently necessary to develop international cooperation between 
States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention, prosecution and 
punishment of all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of terrorism” (emphasis 
added).
36
  Unlike most of the other terrorism treaties, the preamble here explicitly mentions 
the human rights that correlate to the duties that the convention imposes.  “[E]veryone has 
                                                 
31
 For a comprehensive analysis of this treaty with a focus on its drafting history, see Tswanya’s Analysis of 
the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. 
32
 For example, Art. III(1) states, “Each State Party shall take the necessary and effective measures to 
prohibit and prevent the movement into and out of its territory of unmarked explosives.” 
33
 Rosenstock p. 172, citing Nanda, Progress Report on the United Nations’ Attempt to Draft an 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 6 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 89, 89 (1979). 
34
 Rosenstock, p. 173 
35
 See Rosenstock, p. 170, citing the statements of Liberia, Egypt, Australia, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, 
Singapore, and Nigeria.   
36
 Hostages Convention, preamble. 
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the right to life, liberty and security of person, as set out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”37   
3.1.1 Offenses covered 
The first area of commonality among the treaties is that they each specify which 
terrorist offenses are covered by the treaty.  Like any definition of a crime, they contain 
both an act and a mental element, although the mental element is often not explicitly 
specified in international crimes.
38
  The Hostages Convention begins with the physical act.  
“Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain 
another person (hereinafter referred to as the ‘hostage’)” fulfills the conditions of the 
physical element.
39
  The mental element is slightly more complex.  The act must be “in 
order to compel a third party… to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or 
implicit condition for the release of the hostage.”40  In addition, attempting to commit an 
act of hostage-taking and working as an accomplice to an act of hostage-taking are also 
criminalized.
41
 
 In contrast, the second convention to be signed, the Hague Convention, focuses on 
the physical act in its description of the crime, criminalizing any person on an aircraft in 
flight who unlawfully “seizes, or exercises control of” that aircraft.42  Like the Hostages 
Convention, the Hague Convention also criminalizes attempting the crime.  The mental 
element is absent though.  Any reasonable reading of the text, however, must infer that the 
mental state required is intent.   
 The seventh convention, the Montreal Protocol, alters the original Montreal 
Convention (the third treaty) by adding airports into the scope of unlawful acts against the 
safety of civil aviation.  The added offenses track, almost word for word, the original 
offenses of the Montreal Convention with “airport” substituted for “aircraft.”  The offenses 
prohibited by the Montreal Protocol (and the convention) are more detailed than the two 
older treaties.  The physical act in the protocol adds that any person commits an offense if 
he “performs an act of violence against a person at an airport which causes or is likely to 
cause serious injury or death” or “destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an 
airport…or aircraft…or disrupts the services of the airport,” so long as those acts endanger 
                                                 
37
 Hostages Convention, preamble. 
38
 Cassese, International Criminal Law, p. 56 
39
 Hostages Convention, Art 1.1 
40
 Hostages Convention, Art 1.1 
41
 Hostages Convention, Art 1.2 
42
 Hague Convention, Art 1(a) 
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or are likely to endanger the safety at the airport.
43
  In addition, although the Montreal 
Convention was written only a year later than the Hague Convention, it explicitly includes 
the mental element by requiring the conduct to be done “intentionally.”44   
 The twelfth treaty, the Terrorist Financing Convention of 1999, provides a good 
example of the increasing specificity among the treaties as the decades passed.  The 
physical act covered by the convention is more complex than those found in the earlier 
treaties and the mental element is more detailed.  An individual satisfies the physical 
element under the convention if he or she “by any means, directly or indirectly…provides 
or collects funds” that are used to carry out either (a) an offense covered by the previous 
terrorism treaties or  
 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
45
 
 
In contrast to the Montreal Protocol’s use of “intentionally” as the mental element, the 
Terrorist Financing Convention states that the act of providing or collecting the funds must 
be performed “willfully” and with either “the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used” to carry out the offenses listed above.46  This 
bifurcated mental element allows for a more nuanced offense than those listed in earlier 
treaties.  Additionally, the treaty contains more comprehensive language for inchoate 
versions of the primary offense, covering attempt,
47
 acting as an accomplice,
48
 
solicitation,
49
 and a basic form of conspiracy.
50
  
                                                 
43
 Montreal Protocol, Art II(1) 
44
 Montreal Protocol, Art II(1) 
45
 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art 2(1) 
46
 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art 2(1) 
47
 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art 2(4) 
48
 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art 2(5)(a) 
49
 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art 2(5)(b) 
50
 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art 2(5)(c), But see Laborde and DeFeo arguing that this offense is not a 
form of conspiracy but a new category that covers “non-violent financial preparations” p. 1091 
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3.1.2 Enactment in domestic law 
The second area of commonality among the treaties is that they each require state 
parties to criminalize the offenses under domestic law.  The Hostages Convention states 
this clearly, “Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 1 punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences.”51  This 
formulation is slightly changed from the earliest treaties.  For example, the third treaty, the 
Montreal Convention states, “Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offences 
mentioned in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties.”52  The two key changes are the 
switch from “undertakes” to “shall,” eliminating any undesired ingenuity for the state in 
implementation and replacing “severe penalties” with “appropriate penalties which take 
into account the grave nature” of the offenses.  This latter change more explicitly connects 
the character of the penalties with the character of the offense.  Almost ten years later, by 
the time of the drafting of the eighth treaty, the Maritime Convention, the formulation set 
forth in the Hostages Convention proved to be non-controversial
53
 and the new convention 
replicated its language save for the change in antecedent article number.
54
 
After another ten years, the formulation did change in the eleventh treaty, the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention of 1998.  Its Article 4 splits the Hostages Convention’s 
single clause into two sub-clauses.
55
  Additionally, it adds text not seen in any of the prior 
treaties.  Article 5 forces states to adopt measures to ensure that the offenses covered by 
the convention, particularly when they are intended to cause terror, are not justifiable by 
“political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious” or other similar 
considerations.
56
  This article was included because some delegations believed in the 
importance of highlighting that the conduct prohibited by the treaty can cause terror and to 
emphasize that the motivations of this conduct are not relevant in punishing offenders.
57
  
The two latest conventions also incorporated similar clauses.
58
 
3.1.3 Jurisdiction 
The third area of commonality among the treaties is that they each require state 
parties to establish jurisdiction over the offenses.  The Hostages Convention obliges state 
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parties to “take such measures as may be necessary” to establish jurisdiction over the any 
of the offences listed in Article 1 that are committed: 
 
(a) In its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
(b) By any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate, by 
those stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its territory; 
(c) In order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or 
(d) With respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State 
considers it appropriate.
59
 
 
Sub-section a, the territorial principle, is the most classic claim of jurisdiction and without 
controversy.  Sub-section b, the nationality principle, is also well accepted under 
international law.  Sub-section c, the protective principle, is also uncontroversial.  Sub-
section d, the passive personality principle, as illustrated by its optional nature, had been 
more controversial but has been receiving greater acceptance recently.  While the 
terminology used to describe these types of jurisdiction varies by author and other authors 
may have other names for these categories, this is the structure the treaties use to establish 
jurisdiction.  Notably, none of the treaties includes universal jurisdiction.   
 Although all the treaties contain a clause requiring state parties to establish 
jurisdiction over the offenses, they vary in respect to not only which of these principles 
they include, but also which are mandatory and which are optional.  For instance, the first 
treaty, the Tokyo Convention, requires a state to take necessary measures to establish 
jurisdiction if it is the state of registration for the aircraft on which the offenses are 
committed—essentially the aviation version of the territorial principle.60  In contrast, states 
are permitted, but not required, to exercise jurisdiction using the objective territorial 
principle,
61
 the nationality principle,
62
 the passive personality principle,
63
 the protective 
principle,
64
 or when they are obligated to do so by prior international agreement.
65
 
 The ninth treaty, the Fixed Platform Protocol to the Maritime Convention, obliges a 
state to take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction if that state is the location of the 
fixed platform where the offense took place or a national of that state committed the 
offense (nationality principle).
66
  The protocol also gives states the option to establish 
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jurisdiction using the passive personality principle,
67
 the protective principle,
68
 and over 
stateless persons who habitually reside in the state.
69
 
 The Terrorist Bombing Convention also obliges a state to take necessary measures 
to establish jurisdiction if that state is the location of the offense or is the state of 
registration for a vessel or aircraft where the offense occurred.
70
  Additionally, a state is 
required to establish jurisdiction using the nationality principle.
71
  In contrast, a state may 
establish jurisdiction using the passive personality principle,
72
 the protective principle,
73
 
over offenses committed against its facilities abroad,
74
 over stateless persons who 
habitually reside in the state,
75
 and over offenses committed on board aircraft operated by 
the state.
76
 
3.1.4 Extradite or prosecute 
The fourth area of commonality among the treaties is that they each require state 
parties to extradite or prosecute offenders.
77
  The requirement “amounts to the duty to 
investigate and then to either report the offender for prosecution or extradite the offender to 
a State that will prosecute.”78  The state does not actually have to prosecute the offender, 
but must merely report him or her to the authorities for prosecution.  The decision on 
whether or not to prosecute must, however, be made in good faith.
79
   
Although the formulation of this requirement varies slightly among the treaties, the 
Hostages Convention’s articulation is typical of one version: 
 
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, 
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and 
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through 
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.  Those authorities 
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shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary 
offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.
 80 
 
Some of the treaties that use this version change the text for where the alleged offender “is 
found” to “is present”81 and others also add that the state party must submit the case for 
prosecution “without delay”82 or “without undue delay.”83   
The other version of the requirement drops both “whether or not the offence was 
committed in its territory” and the entire last sentence.84  Because the articles covering 
jurisdiction already include offenses not committed in a state party’s territory, the phrase 
was viewed as unnecessary and superfluous.
85
  The last sentence of the first version has no 
corresponding clause in this version.  In spite of this omission, a good faith interpretation 
of the article would require that the state party treat the decision in a manner consistent 
with the last sentence of the first version. 
In addition to the main extradite or prosecute provision, the treaties also include 
articles designed to supplement the extradition process.   
 
Typically, these rules stipulate that the terrorist offences are deemed to be 
included within existing extradition treaties and to be explicitly included in 
future treaties; that the individual terrorism convention may be regarded as 
an extradition treaty in the absence of an actual bilateral treaty; and that the 
terrorist offences are not to be regarded as falling within the ‘political 
offence’ exception common to extradition treaties.86 
 
These articles are too long and detailed to be included in full here, but they can be found in 
each convention.  In the Hostages Convention, for example, they are Article 9 and Article 
10.   
Overall, although the “extradite or prosecute” requirement can be circumvented 
somewhat easily, it gives some teeth to the treaties, pushing them from aspirational to 
functional.  For this reason, it remains the cornerstone of the terrorism treaty regime. 
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3.1.5 State cooperation 
The fifth area of commonality among the treaties is that they each require state 
parties to cooperate with one another in respect to actions covered by the treaty.  Although 
some treaties add further details, the crux of the requirement is found in the general article 
on cooperation.  In the Hostages Convention, this article states, “States Parties shall afford 
one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings 
brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 1, including the supply of all evidence 
at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.”87  In contrast to the formulations in earlier 
treaties such as the Montreal Convention and Hague Convention, this language varies in 
that it explicitly adds that the supply of evidence is included in the requirement.
88
  The 
latter series of treaties also expands the scope of what state parties must assist each other 
with, adding investigations and extradition proceedings to the criminal proceedings of the 
earlier treaties.
89
 
The general article in each treaty also contains a secondary section designed to 
ensure that existing treaty obligations related to mutual assistance in criminal matters will 
not be disturbed by each new convention.
90
  The latter series of treaties adds that “in the 
absence of such treaties, States Parties shall afford each other assistance in accordance with 
their national law.”91 
The twelfth treaty, the Terrorist Financing Convention, adds specific finance-
related requirements to the general provisions found in the other treaties.  These 
requirements include not refusing requests for assistance on the ground of bank secrecy,
92
 
not using information or evidence received for proceedings other than those it for which it 
was requested,
93
 and giving “consideration to establishing mechanisms” to share 
information with other parties to the treaty.
94
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3.2 How the duties have changes over time 
3.2.1 In general 
As alluded to in the previous section, there has been a slight shift in the duties over 
time.  In general, the later treaties are more specific in their requirements than the earlier 
treaties.
95
  This change has been most evident in the areas of offenses covered and 
jurisdiction.  In contrast to earlier treaties, the three most recent treaties—the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention, the Terrorist Financing Convention, and the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention—include highly detailed descriptions of the offenses, including definitions 
articles.
96
  These articles further flesh out the already thorough primary articles describing 
the offenses covered.
97
  In terms of jurisdiction, the early treaties have simple rules on 
jurisdiction, while later conventions “adopt more detailed and extensive, and in some cases 
bifurcated, rules on jurisdiction.”98  As mentioned in the section on jurisdiction, the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention obligates states to take jurisdiction in some circumstances, 
while offering states the option to take jurisdiction in five others.
99
 
 In addition, some later treaties have increased the scope of coverage.  While the 
earlier treaties target a specific action, such as the seizure of aircraft
100
 or the taking of 
hostages,
101
 these later treaties come closer to encompassing entire areas of terrorist 
activity.  Although the Terrorist Bombing Convention and the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention are both somewhat more expansive than the earlier treaties, the Terrorist 
Financing Convention goes the farthest in enlarging the coverage area.  As noted above in 
the section on offenses covered, the convention contains actions that occur well before any 
injury takes place, including actions that only indirectly provide or collect funds to be used 
to further acts of terrorism.
102
  Additionally, unlike with most of the other treaties, an act of 
violence never actually has to occur for a violation to take place.
103
  Taken as a whole, the 
Terrorist Financing Convention covers all willful funding of potential terrorist acts.  
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Compared to merely covering the seizure of an aircraft, the Terrorist Financing Convention 
greatly increases the reach of international law in the field of terrorism.
104
 
3.2.2 Prevention 
The earliest treaties came about as a response to terrorist activities in specific areas 
and were designed to criminalize those types of actions in the future.  For example, the 
Hague Convention was developed as a response to increases in aircraft hijacking and 
criminalizes the act of hijacking or attempting to hijack an aircraft.
105
  As is typical in these 
early treaties, any requirement to prevent the act from occurring was not included. 
 Over time, however, the conventions have increasingly included more preventative 
aspects.  The Nuclear Materials Convention, opened for signature in 1980 as the sixth 
treaty, was the first to include preventative features.  The convention criminalizes actions 
well before any damage has occurred and includes significant regulatory provisions for the 
transport of nuclear materials.
106
  The 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention continued this 
development by regulating both the movement of unmarked explosives and requiring 
“strict and effective” inventory controls over unmarked explosives within a state party’s 
territory.
107
  The Terrorist Financing Convention of 1999, as discussed in the previous 
section, does not require a violent offense to occur, but instead criminalizes the financial 
preparations supporting planned violent acts.
108
  The most recent treaty in force, the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention of 2005, also includes preventative elements, such as 
criminalizing possession of radioactive material with “the intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury.”109  Thus, it appears that states are growing somewhat more comfortable 
with using conventional law to address terrorism before violence occurs.   
3.2.3 Changes after September 11th  
Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 dramatically increased the attention 
paid to terrorism around the world, they, surprisingly, did not significantly alter the 
international legal approach to combating terrorism.
110
  Since the attacks, the fragmented 
style of targeting specific actions with a convention to address those actions has not 
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changed.  Only one convention in force, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, was written 
after September 11
th
.  Aside from the slight changes mentioned in the previous two 
subsections, it follows the algorithm established over the previous 40 years for tackling a 
given problem.   
 The recent Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to 
International Civil Aviation [Beijing Convention], completed in 2010, has yet to enter into 
force.
111
  Although speculating on a treaty’s ratification chances is always little more than 
offering an educated guess, the treaty should eventually enter into force as the fourteenth 
terrorism treaty.  As the full title implies, the Beijing Convention is intended as an update 
to the Montreal Convention and Montreal Protocol.  Article 24 ensures that there is clarity 
on that point, stating that “this Convention shall prevail” over those two instruments.112   
 While not stating so explicitly in the text, the Beijing Convention was influenced 
by the attacks of September 11
th
 as those attacks prompted an initial review of the 
Montreal Convention.
113
  This review led to the conclusion that “the existing international 
regime did not cover notable aspects of these attacks—for instance, the use of an aircraft to 
cause death and destruction.”114  As a result, the treaty that emerged maintains the same 
structure as the earlier treaties
115
 and, in its listing of the offenses covered, it includes using 
an aircraft as a weapon.  “Any person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and 
intentionally…uses an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily 
injury, or serious damage to property or the environment.”116  This new offense would 
cover actions mimicking those of the September 11
th
 hijackers.   
 In short, while attitudes toward terrorism changed in the aftermath of September 
11
th
, the conventional legal approach did not.
117
  With the exception of one offense in the 
Beijing Convention designed to target the specific behavior that the hijackers exhibited,
118
 
September 11
th
 had little impact on the terrorism treaties.  And, even the offense that was 
added was done so as a specific, targeted action within the broader framework of five 
common features of the terrorism treaty regime. 
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3.3 Where the duties fit within the Knox Pyramid 
 Of the five features common to the multilateral terrorism treaties, the core duty that 
each places is found in the offenses covered section.  In contrast to most human rights 
treaties, however, each of the terrorism treaties is essentially a very detailed explanation of 
one duty or offense.  Thus, almost all of the other articles in each treaty exist to flesh out 
and help implement that core duty.   
 In terms of the Knox Pyramid, all of the offenses covered by the terrorism treaties 
fall under level two—specification.  As detailed in section 3.1.2 above, the treaties require 
state parties to make the offenses punishable under the domestic laws of the state.  Because 
the treaties require this domestic action, these offenses are not directly placed by the 
treaties at the international level and, therefore, cannot be level three or four.  In addition, 
the level of detail for each offense is well past mere contemplation as required by level 
one.   
 Knox notes that it “may be more accurate to think of specification as a range (from 
“less specific” to “more specific”) rather than a switch (from “not specific” to 
“specific”).”119  Within this range, less specific duties would be near the bottom of level 
two while more specific duties would be near the top.  While there is some variation within 
the terrorism treaties in terms of specificity, all of them are fairly high level two as the 
extradite or prosecute requirement itself is quite specific.  In particular though, the last two 
treaties to be signed, the Terrorist Financing Convention and the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention, are extremely high level two.   
 The Terrorist Financing Convention, for example, requires state parties to “take 
necessary measures” to hold legal entities liable criminally, civilly, or administratively 
when a person controlling the legal entity commits an offense under the convention.
120
  It 
also stipulates that the liability shall be incurred “without prejudice to the criminal liability 
of individuals having committed the offences.”121  Furthermore, the sanctions that the legal 
entities incur must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”122  The convention has 
similarly detailed requirements regarding, among others, the seizure or freezing of 
funds,
123
 the forfeiture of funds,
124
 identification and monitoring of customers’ activity,125 
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and measures to detect and monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and 
negotiable instruments.
126
 
 Signed just six years later, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention continued this shift 
towards even more specific requirements.  Like the Terrorist Financing Convention, the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention includes a very detailed definitions section.  The definition 
for radioactive material is illustrative: 
 
“Radioactive material” means nuclear material and other radioactive 
substances which contain nuclides which undergo spontaneous 
disintegration (a process accompanied by emission of one or more types of 
ionizing radiation, such as alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma rays) 
and which may, owning to their radiological or fissile properties, cause 
death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the 
environment.”127 
 
Additionally, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention provides extremely detailed requirements 
regarding how state parties must cooperate with each other, such as taking “all practicable 
measures” to prevent and counter preparations for the commission of the listed offenses, 
“including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and 
organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or provide technical 
assistance or information or engage in the perpetration of those offences.”128  Moreover, 
the convention continues with exceptionally in depth requirements regarding what state 
parties must do upon seizing or taking control of radioactive material following the 
commission of an offense.
129
 
Although these treaties do not go so far as to provide the exact wording that state 
parties must use to enact these provisions, they leave minimal room for state creativity.  
They are highly intrusive to state parties, taking away nearly all actual decision making 
authority related to the subjects they cover.  Yet, they stop short of making the offenses 
crimes under international law and pushing the duties incurred to level three.   
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4 Analysis of the how the law related to the terrorism treaties should be 
While the multilateral terrorism treaties currently specify duties on private actors at 
a very high level two on the Knox Pyramid, there has not been any commentary, even 
commentary prior to or ignoring the Knox framework, about whether or not this duty level 
is appropriate.
130
  With the variety of options available to treaty drafters, it begs the 
question of how the law should be in these types of treaties.  Lex ferenda analyses of this 
sort can mistakenly focus heavily on legal considerations while assuming away practical 
ones.  Just as terrorism itself cannot be assumed away, the intense negotiation process of 
both treaty drafting and ratification also cannot be assumed away.  As a result, I will 
attempt to balance a variety of considerations, with legal ones serving as only a factor.   
 Although the Knox Pyramid is comprised of four distinct levels—contemplation, 
specification, placement, and enforcement—the divisions between levels may not always 
be precise.  Additionally, duties can fall higher or lower within a given level.  Therefore, it 
may be more accurate to envision the pyramid as “smooth-sided rather than a ziggurat.”131  
Regardless of level, however, the conceptual basis for private duties is the same: “the 
enjoyment of many human rights may be interfered with by private actors, not just by 
governments; private actions must therefore be addressed to protect human rights fully.”132 
 Because the conceptual basis is the same, why does human rights law place duties 
at these four levels?  What benefits are there to a multi-level system as opposed to placing 
and enforcing all duties directly (level four) or as opposed to allowing only states to 
regulate private conduct?  In order to reach a satisfactory answer regarding what level the 
duties placed by the terrorism treaties should be, it is necessary to discuss why there are 
different levels first. 
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4.1 Why the multi-level system for private duties exists 
The disparity between how duties are placed upon non-state actors and how they 
are placed upon states under human rights law is clear from the Knox Pyramid.  Such a 
pyramid does not exist for the duties placed upon states because all of those duties are 
placed and enforced directly or, in Knox Pyramid terms, placed at level four.   
In terms of power, there is a stark difference between governments and private 
actors.  As Knox notes, “Even a relatively weak government probably wields more power 
over the human beings within its jurisdiction than any other single entity.”133  
Consequently, governments have a greater capacity to violate human rights.  In spite of 
this, however, private actors can cumulatively cause widespread violations of human 
rights,
134
 necessitating protection from the actions of private actors as well.  The question 
is where this protection should come from.  The contrast in answers between the multi-
level system for private duties and the single-level system for state duties can be attributed 
to several factors. 
International law lacks “the practical and political capacity” to enforce all private 
duties.
135
  From a practical perspective, there are vastly more resources available for 
enforcement at the domestic level.  International institutions are tiny by bureaucratic 
standards
136
 and there seems to be little political will for the type of expansion that 
enforcing all private duties would require.  Additionally, oppressive governments can 
potentially push for and use international duties as a ploy for restricting human rights.
137
   
Although the factors in the prior paragraph point toward leaving private duties to 
domestic law, there are opposing factors that indicate why it is not left entirely to domestic 
law.
138
  In some cases, a non-state actor may acting “so much like a government, or in such 
close complicity with it, that it should be treated according to the same standards that apply 
to governments.”139  Even when the non-state actor is not acting like a government, 
however, structural considerations within a state can mean that the government ignores 
human rights violations.  Governments that are beholden to elites with little concern for 
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average citizens or minority groups cannot be trusted to protect the rights of those non-
elites.  Therefore, international human rights law has at least some role to play.
140
   
The structure of private duties under international human rights law, and 
correspondingly the structure of the Knox Pyramid, is the result of “these two cross-cutting 
pressures: on the one hand, the practical and political need to use domestic institutions 
wherever possible; and on the other, the need to use international law where domestic 
institutions are inadequate.”141  The primary reason for the difference in treatment between 
duties placed upon governments and those placed upon private actors—why these 
pressures are resolved so strongly in favor of international involvement—is because 
domestic laws cannot effectively safeguard violations by governments.  Although 
constitutions can make it more difficult, governments can change the laws that constrain 
them in a manner unavailable to private actors.
142
  The multi-level approach used for 
violations by private actors combines the benefits of both the fully domestic and the fully 
international approach.  As stated by Knox in his defense of the more complex structure, 
“It addresses private violations of human rights without opening the door to converse 
duties to the state; where possible, it draws on the resources of national governments; and, 
where necessary, it provides international human rights law with a crucial, albeit limited, 
role in specifying, placing, and enforcing private duties.”143 
4.2 What level the terrorism laws should be 
As noted above, the duties placed by the terrorism treaties are currently a very high 
level two in the Knox Pyramid.  In order to discuss what level they should be, I will 
present arguments both in favor and against placing them at each level.   
4.2.1 Level one 
Unlike for the other levels, there are few reasonable arguments for placing the 
terrorism laws at level one.  At this level, international law contemplates the duties 
imposed, leaving great discretion over specificity, implementation, and enforcement to 
states.  Although this deference to states can offer some benefits, such as allowing a state 
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greater creativity in crafting laws tailored precisely to its needs and being less likely to 
upset the delicate balance of existing legislation, the costs are high. 
With the rise of modern transnational terrorism and the lack of an agreed upon 
comprehensive definition of terrorism, providing states with no more framework than a 
due diligence obligation is asking for a return to the days before the terrorism treaties were 
signed.  The cliché about one man’s terrorist being another’s freedom fighter would come 
into much sharper focus.  States could never be sure whether a suspect would be arrested, 
interrogated, or extradited.  The increased creativity would allow states to draft exclusions 
for almost anything—political offenses, fighting for self-determination, denying 
extradition to states with crosses in their flags.  In short, if it can be imagined, states would 
likely come up with it as an excuse not to treat terrorism allegations seriously for those 
perpetrators with whom they might have sympathy.   
Therefore, it appears to be more effective to at least specify particular actions that 
make up a terrorist act.  This changes the focus from whether or not the perpetrator is a 
terrorist to whether or not he committed the actions of the offense.  Merely contemplating 
the duties that states have in combating terrorism would leave too much discretion to 
states. 
4.2.2 Level two 
At this level, international law specifies the duties imposed, leaving implementation 
and enforcement to states.  In general, private duties are “more apt to be specified the more 
susceptible they are to violation by private actors and the more unable domestic law is to 
address them satisfactorily.”144  There is some variation within the level as lower level two 
duties are specified, but little else.  They are light on details and still leave a lot of margin 
for state creativity.  In contrast, higher level two duties are highly specific, leaving almost 
no space for anything more than state implementation. 
 Duties are also often specified “in areas that are difficult or impossible for the 
domestic law of any single state to tackle effectively.”145  Knox uses the “prosecute or 
extradite” provisions of the terrorism treaties as an illustrative example of how 
specification was used to solve the problem of establishing jurisdiction over these actors 
that routinely cross borders.
146
  Just because specification was used does not mean that it is 
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necessarily the best choice to solve this type of problem, though, only that the solution 
must be at least level two.   
4.2.2.1 Advantages 
That being said, one of the most convincing reasons for placing the terrorism laws 
at level two is that they are already there.  The treaties have gone through the meat grinder 
of international relations, having been negotiated, signed, and widely ratified.  These 
processes can take years at best.  I do not wish to overstate this point, however, as its 
advantages are not overwhelming.  After all, the existing terrorism treaties were signed and 
ratified, and the political landscape varied drastically from 1963 to 2005.  There is no 
reason to think that, if an offense were considered an important enough problem, a treaty 
could not get signed and ratified today.  This would, however, take considerable time. 
 Another practical benefit of placing the terrorism laws at level two is that space for 
creativity in implementation can lead to better domestic laws.  Unlike duties at higher 
levels where the duty is placed directly by international law, all states must create domestic 
legislation at level two.  Although the offense itself is often tightly specified, much of the 
supporting language is not.  States can write their laws as they see fit.  If one state notices 
that another state’s manner of implementation appears to be more effective, the first state 
can copy the more effective law.  While the space for experimentation is limited due to the 
specificity of the treaties, placing the duties at level two at least allows some 
experimentation, which is impossible as international requirements become more 
restrictive at higher levels. 
In addition, individuals are used to looking to their domestic governments for 
criminal laws, not to international bodies.  Knox explains this advantage well: 
 
“[I]ndividuals and other private actors are more likely to accept the 
legitimacy of international norms when they have been incorporated into 
domestic law.  Individuals acknowledge that their governments have 
jurisdiction to determine and enforce their rights and duties; they are less 
likely to accept that international bodies controlled by foreign governments 
have such jurisdiction.”147 
 
This is not to say that individuals cannot overcome this preference, such has been the case 
for genocide or crimes against humanity, but merely that the preference is structural and an 
advantage of level two.   
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 Finally, duties that are placed at level two are more democratic than those placed 
directly by international law.  Individuals can protest, lobby, and influence their own 
government much more effectively than they can an international body.  This problem is 
most evident in the European Union where supranational law making has increased the 
democratic deficit felt by many Europeans.
148
  While labeling the terrorism offenses a 
crime under international law is not directly comparable, it shares the same fundamental 
problem: in order to change laws, individuals must convince not only their own 
governments, but those in other countries as well.  This extra layer would stifle the 
democratic process, whereas keeping the terrorism laws at level two somewhat alleviates 
these concerns.  Again, though, the highly specific nature of terrorism treaties lessens this 
advantage.    
4.2.2.2 Disadvantages 
In spite of the many advantages to placing the terrorism laws at level two, there are 
several significant drawbacks.  First, although creativity in implementation can lead to 
better national laws over time, this type of experimentation, combined with latent issues 
such as lack of resources or will, only increases the likelihood that some domestic laws 
will be poorly implemented at best or, at worst, serve as a vehicle for human rights 
violations.  While this variation leads to better results in the long run, in any particular state 
or in any particular case, it may lead to unacceptable consequences.   
 Tying into this concern, the second problem is the lack of feedback during the 
domestic legislative process.  Instead of hearing critique from the diverse array of states as 
in a rule set at the international level, drafters will, at best, only receive criticism from 
domestic opposition parties.  In states with no viable opposition, drafting will take place in 
a vacuum, likely leading to less effective legislation.  Nonetheless, this disadvantage is 
tempered by the highly specific nature of the treaties and their more limited space for 
creativity. 
A third problem relates to the procedure behind creating obligations on non-state 
actors.  At level two, this is a two-step process.  First, the treaty itself must be ratified.  
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Second, the domestic legislation must be written and passed.
149
  While this extra step might 
appear innocuous, both treaties and laws take time to be enacted and, during that time 
frame, governments can change, making the passage of the subsequent law less assured.
150
   
 In sum, there are significant advantages to placing the terrorism laws at level two.  
These need to be balanced against the disadvantages, but duties at this level appear to be 
viable.   
4.2.3 Level three 
At this level, international law specifies and places the duties imposed, leaving only 
enforcement to states.  The only distinction between levels two and three is that the 
obligation is imposed directly at level three rather than indirectly at level two.  Although 
this distinction might appear semantic, at level three, “the international community as a 
whole exercises prescriptive jurisdiction over individuals in a way that makes them directly 
subject to international law apart from the mediating intervention of domestic law.”151  At 
level two, states retain domestic jurisdiction over individuals. 
Very few obligations are placed directly by international law.  There seems to be a 
strong presumption that almost all duties placed on non-state actors should be done via 
domestic law, rather than directly by international law.  Knox notes that, to necessitate 
“direct imposition by international law, violations must be considered both of 
extraordinary international significance and extraordinarily ill-suited to domestic 
enforcement.”152  Does terrorism meet the requirements? 
There is little doubt that, over the last twenty years and particularly since 
September 11, 2001, terrorism has become one of the major concerns of the international 
community.  For example, shortly after the attacks of September 11
th
, the United Nations 
Security Council formed a permanent Counter-Terrorism Committee.
153
  Additionally, the 
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NATO military action in Afghanistan stemmed directly from those attacks.
154
  Major 
terrorist attacks continued throughout the decade including, among others, the 2003 
bombings in Istanbul, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the 2004 Beslan school hostage 
crisis, the 2005 London transport bombings, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2011 
Norway attacks.  These continued attacks have proved that terrorism is a worldwide 
concern that is not disappearing soon.  Therefore, it does seem accurate to say terrorism is 
of “extraordinary international significance.” 
At first glance, in analyzing the second requirement, it appears that Knox confused 
the threshold of level three (international placement) with the threshold of level four 
(international enforcement); either the suitability of domestic enforcement should not be a 
factor or it should be a factor leading to placement at level four.  Yet, this binary criticism 
suffers from a lack of nuance.   
One of the primary advantages of placing a duty at level three is that it provides the 
foundation for later enforcement at level four.  While there is no requirement that a duty 
placed at level three ever be enforced at the international level, the opportunity to do so 
only becomes available once it is placed directly by international law.  The nature and 
understanding of international law develop over time and, as such, enforcement at the 
international level can emerge over time as well.  It is in this sense that the suitability of 
domestic enforcement is relevant, as a violation that is extraordinarily ill-suited to 
domestic enforcement would be a much stronger candidate for eventual enforcement at the 
international level. 
Additionally, obligations at level three, placed directly by international law, are not 
just of international significance, but are also of grave seriousness.  These types of 
obligations—prohibitions against genocide, crimes against humanity, and apartheid—are 
difficult to enforce domestically.  State prosecutors likely have little to no experience in 
trying such cases.  Perpetrators are likely high ranking or formerly high ranking officials 
within the state.  These cases are invariably high profile, expensive, and time consuming.  
States that have recently recovered from one of these offenses might be in no position to 
prosecute a case of this type.  In spite of the reasons making it unlikely, it is possible for 
states to enforce these obligations domestically.
155
  This means that the obligations’ lack of 
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suitability for domestic enforcement can inform as to the manner of a crime directly placed 
by international law rather than necessarily forcing such a crime to rise to level four.   
It is difficult to argue that terrorism is as “extraordinarily ill-suited to domestic 
enforcement” as the other level three crimes, as the other crimes almost always involve 
high ranking officials within a state.  Terrorism, in contrast, almost never involves high 
ranking officials within a state.  Instead, perpetrators are usually actors who either are from 
outside a state or view themselves as from outside the society of a state in spite of their 
common passport.  Thus, domestic enforcement is often somewhat easier as compared to 
that related to other level three offenses.  Nevertheless, it is often much more difficult as 
compared to that related to any other type of crime.   
The United States’ handling of the trial of alleged September 11th mastermind, 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is an illustrative example.  In that case, Mohammed was 
originally to be tried by a military commission, but a change in administrations from one 
party to another brought an announcement that he was to be tried in a standard civilian 
trial.
156
  After a subsequent election changed the composition of the U.S. Congress again, 
the trial was shifted back to a military commission.
157
  As of November 2011, Mohammed 
has yet to be tried.  While not all terrorism prosecutions will be this difficult, the political 
wrangling behind Mohammed’s prosecution shows that terrorism prosecutions can be 
extraordinarily ill-suited for domestic enforcement.  If an international tribunal existed, 
Mohammed likely would have been tried already.   
Therefore, it appears that terrorism violations can at least meet the two-part 
theoretical threshold for placing the obligations at level three.  Although theory could 
support placing the terrorism obligations directly by international law, the advantages to 
doing so would have to outweigh the costs. 
4.2.3.1 Advantages 
  One signal advantage to placing the obligations directly is that doing so would 
assign a much greater normative weight to the terrorism offenses.  Because international 
law places so few obligations directly on non-state actors, those that it does are given 
heightened emphasis.  Obligations not to commit offenses such as war crimes and genocide 
resonate not just because of the gruesome nature of the offenses, but also because of their 
elevated position.  Mass murder is bad, but genocide rises to another level of immorality 
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even though both violate the right to life of the victims.  To associate terrorism with these 
offenses would emphasize the incredibly serious nature of its acts.   
 Another crucial benefit to placing the obligations at level three is inherent in the 
difference between levels two and three: the obligations are placed directly by international 
law without any need for domestic filtering.  This means what it says; the laws are in place 
the second the treaty is ratified.  There is no delay for domestic legislation to implement 
the law.  There is no need to negotiate within a state over how it will implement the duties.  
In short, the offenses are crimes and private actors are bound by them.       
 A side benefit of placing the obligations directly under international law is that the 
laws would be more uniform.  While more vague duties could lead to laws that are uniform 
merely on their face, the highly specific nature of the terrorism laws leaves little room for 
arguments as to their meaning.  This uniformity would create less room for human rights 
violations by unscrupulous governments using implementing legislation as an excuse for 
illegal behavior.  This advantage is the flip side of the creativity offered to states at level 
two and discussed above.  Neither greater creativity nor greater uniformity appears to offer 
overwhelming arguments in its favor, but it is essential to understand the benefits and 
drawbacks of each approach.   
In comparison to level four, enforcement is far more manageable at the domestic 
level.  The discussion above about whether terrorism was “extraordinarily ill-suited to 
domestic enforcement” accurately conveyed that it can often be ill-suited to domestic 
enforcement in theory.  This poor theoretical fit, however, must be reconciled with the 
resources available in practice.  International enforcement can and does exist, but it is very 
limited in scope.  As mentioned earlier, the budgets of international institutions are 
miniscule and the political will for the considerable expansion does not seem to exist.  In 
contrast, police forces currently operate in every country in the world.  These forces detain, 
interrogate, and arrest suspects every day.  Domestic court systems routinely process 
criminal cases and often have experience prosecuting high profile cases.  Thus, states have 
both the capability and the capacity to handle terrorism suspects more readily than any 
international institution.   
4.2.3.2 Disadvantages 
In spite of the advantages of placing the terrorism laws at level three, there are 
considerable drawbacks.  The biggest disadvantage to moving the duties to this level is 
likely the act of moving itself.  No mechanism exists for changing the thirteen treaties in 
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one fell swoop.  If they were to be changed, each treaty would have to be amended with a 
new protocol.  For bilateral or trilateral treaties, this process can be time consuming, but 
for widely ratified multilateral treaties such as the terrorism treaties, it can be nearly 
impossible to get all of the states to agree.  Some states would undoubtedly disagree that a 
shift to level three is even necessary.  Others might use the occasion to reopen discussions 
of previously agreed upon issues within the treaties.  As discussed above, this problem is 
surmountable, but it would require a major logistical and organizational effort.  
Another way of approaching this problem would be to amend the Rome Statute to 
explicitly include the offenses covered by the terrorism treaties.  However, this only 
partially alleviates the difficulties involved in changing all thirteen treaties.  An 
amendment to the crimes section of the Rome Statute would only require a two-thirds 
majority vote instead of unanimity, but the newly listed crimes would only apply to 
nationals of state parties that had ratified or accepted the amendment.
158
  During the 
negotiations for the Rome Statute, a potential crime of terrorism was discussed at length 
but ultimately could not garner the support of enough states to merit inclusion.
159
 
One of the major reasons why states might attempt to reopen closed discussions 
and why states could not agree on the inclusion of a crime of terrorism is because their 
views on terrorism are divergent.  This is most evident in the lack of a unified definition of 
terrorism.  The terrorism treaties currently take a piecemeal approach to get around this 
problem, but states could be more reluctant to elevate the terrorism offenses to level three 
if they cannot agree what terrorism itself is.  Providing the added weight and seriousness of 
having an obligation imposed directly by international law might not be desirable if a state 
is worried that another might use the extra gravitas as excuse to meddle in what the first 
state sees as terrorist activity but the second state sees as a legitimate expression in the 
struggle for self-determination.  In spite of these differences, the international community 
has routinely attempted to create a definition of terrorism for over fifty years, but 
consensus seems unlikely at present.
160
   
Another potential problem with raising the terrorism duties to level three is the 
increased potential for defiance by suspects and states.  At lower levels, the duties can be 
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viewed as more akin to domestic criminal legislation.  States will often have no qualms 
about locating and extraditing individuals for theft, for example.  At higher levels, in 
contrast, the duties can be viewed as more akin to legalized ethics.  The greater gravitas of 
international placement and the types of crimes that exist at levels three and four can lead 
to official and unofficial reluctance to prosecute or extradite individuals.  Sudan’s refusal 
to arrest Omar al-Bashir in light of warrants for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide is an example of the former type,
161
 while Serbia’s fifteen year delay between 
Ratko Mladic’s alleged commission of genocide and his eventual arrest is debatably an 
example of the latter type.
162
  If the terrorism obligations were raised to level three, the 
extra seriousness that the level connotes could lead to an increase in these types of 
defiance. 
Overall, there are significant advantages to moving the terrorism laws to level 
three, but the practical disadvantages likely outweigh them.  If a unified definition of 
terrorism could be agreed upon, however, many of these concerns would dissipate.     
4.2.4 Level four 
At this level, international law specifies, places, and enforces the duties imposed, 
leaving little to states.  The difference between this level and level three is that 
international law also enforces the obligations at this level.  As Knox notes, this is the 
“most intrusive possible role human rights law can play with respect to domestic 
jurisdiction over private actors.”163  Although a fifth level in which the duties must be 
enforced internationally is possible in theory, the limits placed on international 
enforcement currently make it impossible in practice.  Essentially, the main avenue for 
international enforcement, the International Criminal Court, may only enforce obligations 
if domestic enforcement has failed.
164
 
Additionally, only three private duties may currently be enforced at the 
international level: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
165
  In order to add 
others, either the Rome Statute would have to be amended or an ad hoc tribunal would 
have to be created.  As mentioned in the previous sections, while amending the Rome 
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Statute is feasible,
 166
 it would be difficult to do so.  Assuming it would be possible, there 
are several advantages to placing the obligations at level four. 
4.2.4.1 Advantages 
 First, levels three and four have the direct international placement of the duties in 
common.  Therefore, the advantages of shifting the duties from level two to level three also 
apply with respect to level four.  The remainder of the benefits relate to enforcement, as 
that is the only difference between levels three and four.   
 Second, and most importantly, permitting enforcement through international 
institutions would lead to more uniform handling than allowing it to remain purely 
domestic.  This benefit derives from the variations in quality of criminal justice systems 
around the world.  Although many states have functional and modern systems, even 
variations among these states can be dramatic.  For instance, depending upon the offense, 
one could be put to death in the United States but receive only thirty years imprisonment in 
Norway.
167
  While this sort of divergence could lead better long term solutions, it is less 
uniform.  If terrorism were to be made a crime under international law, these types of 
variations in enforcement are undesirable.  Yet, the variations would not be confined to 
terrorism, as genocide prosecutions under domestic law can vary from those under 
international institutions.
168
  Any prosecutions handled by international institutions, 
though, follow the standardized rules and procedures of those institutions and the 
variations among them are fewer than those among the states of the world.   
 Third, this more uniform enforcement would also ensure that arrests and trials 
would be more equitable for alleged perpetrators who would be tried at an international 
institution.  In some states, arrests can be arbitrary and trials less than fair.  Shifting 
enforcement to an international body helps to eliminate these problems, as alleged 
terrorists deserve to have their human rights respected as well. 
4.2.4.2 Disadvantages 
In spite of the benefits to moving the terrorism laws to level four, there are 
significant drawbacks, the biggest of which might be the act of amending the treaties.  As 
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mentioned in the section on level three, there is no easy solution to changing all of the 
terrorism treaties at once.  Shifting the obligations to level four would be even more work, 
however, as not just the terrorism treaties would need to be amended.  In order make it 
possible to enforce the duties at the international level, either the Rome Statute would need 
to be amended or another tribunal would need to be established for terrorism related 
crimes.  Either process would be difficult and require tremendous amounts of political 
capital to achieve.   
As if achieving that were not difficult enough legally and politically, enforcement 
itself would be a nightmare with the limited resources of the United Nations.  Unless there 
were a new international enforcement body solely dedicated to combating terrorism, this 
would be nothing more than a pipe dream.  Even the idea of states agreeing to such a body 
is likely a pipe dream.  A more limited model utilizing domestic police and investigative 
services is more realistic, but still highly unlikely because of the frequency of terrorist acts 
compared with the other three level four crimes.  If terrorism prosecutions were to be of 
the same standard of quality as those for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, the budget for and staff of the United Nations would need to be drastically 
expanded.   
In conclusion, while there are significant advantages to allowing for international 
enforcement of the terrorist offenses, the practical costs outweigh them.  With the limited 
resources of the United Nations and the frequency of terrorist acts, level four appears to be 
an inappropriately high location for the terrorism duties in the Knox Pyramid. 
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5 Conclusion 
 As I sat in Oslo in the days after the terrorist attacks of July 22
nd
, 2011 struggling to 
finish the draft for this paper, I was forced to think about just how severe the psychological 
impacts of terrorism can be.  Although none of my friends and family were directly 
affected by the tragedy, focusing on or thinking about anything other the horrific events 
proved impossible for days.  It was a stark reminder of how limited the law is in effecting 
change.  In spite of this, the law can and does create a framework for how societies handle 
acts of terrorism.   
 This article has shown how international law has grappled with these problems to 
date.  It has argued that the Knox Pyramid is an excellent tool for analysis of correlative 
duties placed on non-state actors.  The Pyramid sheds light on the manner in which 
international law creates these duties while protecting the human rights that correlate to 
them. 
 Furthermore, this article has analyzed the terrorism treaties currently in force, 
showing their structural similarities.  In spite of the variety of offenses covered, the treaties 
share five key areas of commonality, with all of the treaties creating duties on non-state 
actors at level two of the Knox Pyramid.   
In addition, this article has weighed the costs and benefits of placing these duties at 
each level of the Knox Pyramid.  Levels one and four can be ruled out easily, but levels 
two and three both contain compelling arguments in their favor.  There are legitimate 
reasons for shifting these duties to level three, but it is difficult to say that the duties are 
misplaced in their current implementation.   
A shift to level three or four, however, could potentially offer a dramatic spillover 
effect; an effect that could be seen as either an advantage or a disadvantage depending on 
one’s perspective.  This potential effect stems from the reach of the United States’ Alien 
Tort Statute, which grants jurisdiction to aliens for torts committed in violation of the law 
of nations.
169
  The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the statute will only 
allow suit for some violations of international law, but if the terrorism duties were to shift 
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to level three, there is a strong argument that they would meet this standard.
170
  In that 
case, the doors would be open for victims of acts of terrorism covered by the treaties to 
bring suit for damages in the plaintiff friendly courts of the United States.  Neither the 
victim nor the perpetrator would need to have any further connection to the United States, 
turning the victims of almost all acts of terrorism covered by the treaties into potential 
plaintiffs.  While the United States could change this law at any time, until it actually does 
so, the law’s effects must be considered. 
As detailed above, a shift to level three would present numerous advantages, but 
such a shift faces one primary obstacle: the lack of an agreed upon definition of 
“terrorism” itself.  The juxtaposition of the widespread commonalities among the treaties 
and the absence of a universal definition of terrorism is telling, however, in that states tend 
to agree on almost all aspects of acts of terrorism, but cannot come to a generic consensus.  
If a definition of “terrorism” could be agreed upon and this lacuna filled, many of the 
disadvantages of shifting the obligations to level three would be minimized.  The 
arguments in favor of shifting the duties to level three would then likely outweigh those in 
favor of keeping the duties at level two.  At that point, the Comprehensive Convention 
Against International Terrorism could almost certainly be completed, as defining 
“terrorism” remains the major sticking point in negotiations.  Until and if this occurs, 
however, there are not compelling enough grounds for rewriting the now widely ratified 
anti-terrorism treaty regime. 
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